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ENDING THE SILENCE:
THAI H-2A WORKERS, RECRUITMENT FEES,
AND THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
Andrea L. Schmitt†
Abstract: Increasing numbers of Thai workers are coming to the United States
using “H-2A” temporary agricultural worker visas. Compared with their Latin American
counterparts, Thai H-2A workers are more vulnerable to poor working conditions and
other abusive employment practices for two reasons. First, the workers often pay large
recruitment fees to labor recruiters in Thailand, and they therefore arrive with a much
weightier debt burden. This debt, combined with conditions inherent in the H-2A system,
puts intense pressure on workers to remain silent. Second, Thai workers are more
culturally and linguistically isolated in rural U.S. communities than their Latin American
counterparts. This comment argues that bringing claims under the minimum wage
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) can be an effective litigation
strategy to protect Thai H-2A workers who have a large recruitment-fee debt burden.
Under the doctrines of apparent authority agency and inherent agency, the workers’
employers may be responsible for the fees that recruiters charge. These fees are for the
primary benefit of the growers and cannot be counted as wages under the FLSA.
Consequently, growers must reimburse workers for recruitment fees during their first
week of employment in order to avoid minimum wage violations under the FLSA.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Wallapa McDonald is the owner of one of the three Thai restaurants in
Yakima, Washington. Yakima, a city of 79,000,1 is located in the rural
agricultural region of central Washington State, the northwestern-most state
of the United States. McDonald’s usual clientele is a representative
sampling of the community—mostly White, some Hispanic,2 and the
occasional European or Asian visitor.3 McDonald, who is Thai, estimates
that half a dozen Thai speakers live in Yakima.4 Because she rarely
encounters other Thai people in Yakima, she was understandably astounded5
when a ragged group of Thai farmers wandered into her restaurant one day
in the summer of 2004.6 The men were elated to have found someone who
†
The author would like to thank Professors Kristen Stilt and Joel Ngugi for their invaluable support
and guidance in the writing of this comment.
1
U.S. Census Bureau, Fact Sheet: Yakima city, Washington, http://factfinder.census.gov/home/
saff/main.html?_lang=en (last visited Sept. 19, 2006) [hereinafter Yakima Census].
2
Id. (Yakima is thirty-seven percent Hispanic).
3
Questions Posed to Wallapa McDonald (Feb. 24, 2006) [hereinafter McDonald Questions] (on file
with The Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal).
4
Id.
5
Interview with Wallapa McDonald, Owner, Siam House Restaurant, by telephone (Feb. 23, 2006).
6
Letter from Wallapa McDonald, Owner, Siam House Restaurant 1 (Jan. 22, 2006) [hereinafter
McDonald Letter] (on file with The Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal).
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understood their language, and they told McDonald their story.7 They had
been recruited in Thailand to work in the apple orchards around Yakima8 and
had come to the United States on “H-2A” temporary agricultural worker
visas.9
Life in Yakima had been difficult for the Thai men. They were not
earning nearly as much as they had been promised by the recruiters in
Thailand, and they feared they would not be able to pay back the enormous
loans that they had taken out to pay labor recruiters in Thailand.10 Their
housing was cramped, and it lacked kitchen facilities.11 The workers
suspected that their employers were not paying them correctly, but they had
no way to verify this because none of them could speak English or read the
Roman alphabet.12 Though not a legal expert herself, McDonald was certain
the workers’ living conditions did not meet state standards, and she called
Washington State authorities to report the violations.13 She also helped the
men as best she could, taking them food when their pay was late and
shuttling them the thirty blocks to their hotel from her store, so they would
not have to carry large bags of rice on their shoulders.14
The H-2A program, through which the Thai workers came to Yakima,
is the United States’ agricultural “guest worker” program.15 Established in
its current form through the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act,16
the program allows American agricultural employers to bring foreign
workers to the United States on non-immigrant visas for limited periods of
time.17 Ostensibly, H-2A visas are only granted in times when there are
genuine shortages of domestic labor.18 Growers who use the H-2A program

7

Leah Beth Ward, Thai Farm Workers Seek Equity in Strange Land, YAKIMA HERALD-REPUBLIC,
Oct. 9, 2005.
8
Id.
9
Id. The visas are known as “H-2A” visas after their designation in the Immigration and
Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) (2000).
10
McDonald Letter, supra note 6, at 1.
11
Id. at 1; Ward, supra, note 7.
12
McDonald Letter, supra note 6, at 2.
13
Ward, supra note 7.
14
McDonald Letter, supra note 6 at 1.
15
Bruce Goldstein, The Basics About Guest Worker Programs, http://www.fwjustice.org/
GWbasics.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2006).
16
Kimi Jackson, Comment, Farmworkers, Nonimmigration Policy, Involuntary Servitude, and a
Look at the Sheepherding Industry, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1271, 1278 (2000); see also 8 U.S.C.S. §
1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) (2000).
17
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1)(ii)(C) (2006).
18
See 20 C.F.R. § 655.90(b)(1)(A) (2005).
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usually make connections with foreign workers by using farm labor
contractors, who recruit the workers in their home countries.19
Despite a host of protections and benefits provided by the H-2A
program, experience has shown H-2A workers are prone to abuse by their
employers.20 Thai H-2A workers are even more vulnerable than most other
H-2A workers, who are predominantly Latin American. This is in part
because the Thais are more linguistically and culturally isolated from the
rural American communities where they come to work.21 More importantly,
Thai workers pay substantial recruitment fees in Thailand to secure their H2A jobs and usually arrive in the United States with staggering debt.22 The
magnitude of their debt and the harshness of the loan terms combine with
conditions engendered by the H-2A program to render workers practically
unable to complain about abusive conditions and wage and hour violations.
These burdens also make it virtually impossible for the workers to leave
their jobs. The workers effectively find themselves in debt bondage—they
are unlikely to complain and apt to remain on the job despite poor
conditions.23 Protecting Thai workers from onerous recruitment fee debt
would give the workers more leverage to demand safe and healthy housing
and working environments.
A U.S.-based solution to recruitment fee debt is vital to enabling Thai
H-2A workers to protect themselves from abuse because the Thai
government cannot or will not stop Thai recruiters from charging exorbitant
fees.24 The minimum wage provisions of the federal Fair Labor Standards
Act25 may provide much-needed protection to Thai workers from large
recruitment fees.26
This comment argues that claims under the minimum wage provisions
of the FLSA are a viable litigation strategy for protecting Thai H-2A workers
19

See PHILIP L. MARTIN AND J. EDWARD TAYLOR, MERCHANTS OF LABOR: FARM LABOR
CONTRACTORS AND IMMIGRATION REFORM 1 (The Urban Institute 1995); See Esther Schrader, Widening
the Field of Workers, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 26, 1999 at A1 (A single farm labor contractor in North
Carolina brought half of the H-2A workers to the U.S. in 1999). The growers in Washington who recruited
Thai workers did so by first hiring Global Horizons, a Los Angeles based farm labor contractor. See
Settlement Agreement: Global Horizons, Inc./Department of Labor and Industries/Employment Security
Department 1 (September 22, 2005) [hereinafter Global Settlement] (on file with The Pacific Rim Law &
Policy Journal).
20
See infra Part II.A.
21
See infra Part II.D.
22
See infra Part II.D.
23
See Michael Holley, Disadvantaged by Design: How the Law Inhibits Agricultural Guest Workers
from Enforcing their Rights, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 575, 595-596 (2001).
24
See infra Part III.A.
25
The Fair Labor Standards Act is the primary U.S. federal statute governing wages and hours of
work. See generally 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 201-219 (2000 & Supp. 2006).
26
See infra Part III.D.
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from debilitating recruitment-fee debt. Part II discusses H-2A workers’
vulnerability to abuse and demonstrates that recruitment-fee debt burden
makes Thai workers particularly susceptible to abuse and attractive to U.S.
growers. Part III presents a case that growers can be held accountable under
the common law of agency for recruitment fees. It demonstrates that if
growers are accountable for the fees, the growers violate the FLSA when
they do not reimburse the recruitment fees, at least in part, during the
workers’ first week on the job.
II.

THAI H-2A WORKERS ARE UNIQUELY SUSCEPTIBLE TO THE ABUSIVE
CONDITIONS THAT ARE COMMON IN THE PROGRAM

H-2A agricultural guest workers are susceptible to abuses, such as
deficient housing, poor working conditions, and wage and hour violations,
despite the protections provided for them in the H-2A regulations. It is in
growers’ financial interest to hire workers whose economic vulnerability
makes them responsive to coercive tactics like “blacklisting.”27 Thai
workers are inherently more vulnerable to abuse than most other H-2A
workers in part because they are more linguistically and culturally isolated
from the communities in which they work. They are also uniquely unlikely
to complain about their conditions because Thai workers often come to the
U.S. with weighty debt from recruitment fees they paid at home.28
A.

H-2A Workers Often Experience Abuse

The realities of H-2A workers’ conditions often do not coincide with
H-2A regulations. On paper, the regulations provide an impressive list of
benefits to H-2A workers, including housing, round-trip transportation from
their homes to the job site, a rate of pay that is almost always higher than the
federal minimum wage, and a guarantee that they will have work during at
least three-fourths of the contract period.29 In practice, however, abuses of
H-2A workers are commonplace. Farm worker advocates and reporters have
documented numerous instances of abuse of H-2A workers, including:

27
“Blacklisting” is a tactic in which growers place workers’ names on a “no return” list of workers
who are not allowed to work for that grower again. In North Carolina, for example, “[a]ny one grower in
the [North Carolina Growers’ Association] determines whether an individual worker can come back to
North Carolina and work for any of the almost one thousand growers in the [Association] the following
year.” Mary Lee Hall, Defending the Rights of H-2A Farmworkers, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. Y COM. REG. 521,
533 (2002).
28
See Holley, supra note 23, at 595-596.
29
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.102(b)(1), (5), (6), (9) (2005).
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denial of medical treatment,30 pesticide safety violations,31 wage and hour
violations,32 substandard housing conditions,33 and provision of dangerous
transportation.34
The Washington Thai workers’ experience was no exception. In the
summer of 2004, most of the workers lived in overcrowded motel rooms.35
They were deprived of proper kitchen facilities, and “cooked on the floor
with hot burners plugged onto overloaded circuits and washed dishes in the
bathtub.”36 These conditions violated Washington State Department of
Health regulations.37
The workers suffered wage and hour violations as well. Their farm
labor contractor (“FLC”) illegally withheld state taxes that do not exist and
federal taxes from which the workers were exempt.38 The workers also
alleged that money the FLC deducted to be sent to their families in Thailand
never arrived.39 The terms and conditions of employment remained an
enigma to the workers, leaving them unable to evaluate whether the
contractor and the grower breached their employment contracts.40 Some
workers signed one contract in Thai at home and another contract—which
they could not read because it was in English—when they arrived.41
Furthermore, the FLC never provided a worker agreement in Thai to some of
its workers.42 In at least one instance, even when the farm labor contractor
did provide the contract in Thai, the contract verbiage was difficult for the
worker to understand.43
30
H. Michael Semler, The H-2 Program: Aliens in the Orchard: The Admission of Foreign Contract
Laborers for Temporary Work in U.S. Agriculture, 1 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 209 (1983); Leah Beth
Ward, Desperate Harvest, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct. 31, 1999, at 1A [hereinafter Desperate Harvest].
31
Hall, supra note 27, at 534.
32
Michael Blanding, The Invisible Harvest, BOSTON MAG., Oct. 2002 available at
http://www.bostonmagazine.com/articles/the_invisible_harvest/; Barry Yeoman, Silence in the Fields,
Mother Jones, Jan./Feb. 2001 available at http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/2001/01/farm.html.
33
Desperate Harvest, supra note 30, at 1A.
34
Holley, supra note 23, at 618.
35
Lornet Turnbull, New Guest Worker Contracts in Doubt, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 20, 2002 at A18;
McDonald Letter, supra note 6, at 2; Ward, supra note 7.
36
Ward, supra note 7.
37
Wash. Admin. Code 296-307-16125 (2005) (capacity of housing); Wash. Admin. Code 296-30716165 (2005) (kitchen facilities). For H-2A housing, local housing regulations apply, and if there are none,
state regulations apply. 20 C.F.R § 655.102(b)(1)(iii) (2005).
38
Stipulations of the Parties, In Re: Global Horizons, Inc., No. 2005-LI-0056 at 2-3 (Washington
Office of Administrative Hearings, Sept. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Global Horizons Stipulations]; see Global
Settlement, supra note 19, at Attachment A.
39
Turnbull, supra note 35, at A18.
40
Ward, supra, note 7.
41
Turnbull, supra note 35, at A18.
42
Global Horizons Stipulations, supra note 38, at 2
43
Ward, supra note 7.
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Like other H-2A workers, the Washington Thai workers were reluctant
to protest. The growers deterred them from complaining by threatening to
blacklist them.44 The workers also alleged that the growers punished them
for questioning their conditions by not allowing them to work,45 thereby
denying them the chance to earn money.
B.

Growers Have Incentives to Seek Workers Who Are Economically
Vulnerable and Susceptible to Coercive Tactics

H-2A workers are attractive to growers, who are constantly looking
for new, more vulnerable populations with which to replenish their labor
forces.46 For U.S. growers of labor-intensive crops, a key to keeping
production costs low is finding workers who will work for low wages and in
poor conditions.47 Historically, growers and the government have thwarted
union organizers by ensuring that there is always a ready supply of new
migrant workers who are willing to accept less compensation and fewer
benefits than their better-established peers and who are unlikely to
organize.48 In the past, a porous border with Mexico allowed a steady
stream of new migrants to enter the U.S.49 However, due to stricter border
enforcement or other changing social factors, growers are now finding fewer
Mexican workers who are willing to work in the conditions they offer.50 In
the absence of a steady flow of vulnerable and difficult-to-unionize new
migrants, H-2A workers are the next best thing for growers. H-2A workers
are in the country for finite periods of time51 and have fixed contract terms
and conditions,52 making them unlikely candidates for successful collective
bargaining. Additionally, growers can easily coerce the workers out of
talking to union representatives.53
44

Id. (“…they say they fear anything they say would be used against them and prevent them from
coming back next season.”).
45
Id.
46
See Fred Krissman, Agribusiness Strategies to Divide the Workforce by Class, Ethnicity, and
Legal Status, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND NATIONALITY IN THE UNITED STATES: TOWARD THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 216, 234 (Paul Wong, Ed., 1999).
47
See Id.; Martin and Taylor, supra note 19, at 1.
48
See Krissman, supra note 46, at 225, 232, 239-239; Martin and Taylor, supra note 19, at 6.
49
See generally Krissman, supra note 46.
50
See Farm Labor Shortages, RURAL MIGRATION NEWS, Jan. 7, 2006, http://migration.ucdavis.edu/
rmn/more.php?id=1087_0_4_0 (last visited Sept. 19, 2006); National Public Radio, Labor Shortage
Threatens Winter Lettuce Harvest, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, Dec 29, 2005 available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5074844.
51
8 C.F.R § 214.2(h)(1)(ii)(C) (2006).
52
See 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(14) (2005).
53
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS’ FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE
UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 159 (2004).
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Employers often use threats of deportation and blacklisting as tools to
maximize workers’ acquiescence in poor conditions.54 H-2A workers may
not work for any employer other than the employers who originally sought
their visas.55 Thus, workers who are victims of abuse cannot leave their
employers without immediately invalidating their visas.56 Employers hold
the power to have the workers deported, and the workers have little leverage
in negotiations with the employers.57 Even when employers do not
immediately fire workers for complaining, they often blacklist the workers,58
preventing them from returning the next season.59
The threat of deportation or blacklisting can be more intense for H-2A
workers who go into debt in order to obtain H-2A jobs in the first place.60
An illustrative example of debt pressure can be found in Mexican H-2A
workers, who are often forced to borrow money to pay transportation costs
to the United States61 and obliged to pay recruitment fees of $300 to $1000
at home for the privilege of obtaining a visa.62 Empirically, the added
pressure of debt makes the workers even less likely to complain when
conditions are poor.63
Growers have an interest in employing H-2A workers who have
disincentives to leave their jobs, even when conditions are poor.64 The
workers who are most likely to stay despite abuses are those who are the
most vulnerable. As the President’s Commission on Migratory Labor noted
54
Ward, supra note 7 (“ ‘The system depends on maintaining the fear of being fired or deported and
not being called back next season,’ said Bruce Goldstein, executive director of the Farmworker Justice
Fund…”).
55
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(5)(viii)(B) (2006).
56
Holley, supra note 23, at 595.
57
Semler, supra note 30, at 209 (“…the employer controls the worker’s very right to remain in this
country.”).
58
Holley, supra note 23, at 595.
59
Blacklisting is an extremely common practice among H-2A employers. See HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 53, at 159; Hall, supra note 27, at 533; Desperate Harvest, supra note 30 at 1A;
Yeoman, supra note 32, at para. 27. To end up on a blacklist, a worker need not cause much trouble;
workers fear blacklisting for insisting that employers comply with state requirements as simple as
providing cups for drinking water in the fields. Desperate Harvest, supra note 30, at 1A.
60
Holley, supra note 23, at 595-596.
61
See Schrader, supra note 19,, at A1; Hall, supra note 27, at 534. H-2A regulations require
employers to pay the cost of transportation for workers from their permanent homes, but the employers do
not have to pay the workers until they have completed 50 percent of the contract period. 20 C.F.R. §
655.102(b)(5)(i) (2005). The Eleventh Circuit held in Arriaga v. Florida Pacific Farms that, under the
FLSA, growers were required to reimburse at least some of these transportation costs during the first week
of work to avoid minimum wage violations. Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, LLC, 305 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir
2002).
62
Schrader, supra note 19, at A1; Desperate Harvest, supra note 30, at 1A; Jen McCaffery,
Virginia’s Migrants Easily Exploited, ROANOKE TIMES, Dec. 10, 2000, at A1.
63
See Holley, supra note 23, at 596; Hall, supra note 27, at 534.
64
Comm’n on Agricultural Workers, Report 26 (1992).
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in 1951, “Migrants are children of misfortune. . . . We depend on misfortune
to build up our force of migratory workers and when the supply is low
because there is not enough misfortune at home, we rely on misfortune
abroad to replenish the supply.”65 Likewise, when there is not enough
misfortune in the Latin American farm worker population to keep them
silenced and on the job, U.S. growers turn to more vulnerable populations,
like Thai workers.
C.

Thai H-2A Workers Are Attractive to Growers Because They Are
Linguistically and Culturally Isolated

H-2A workers from Thailand are especially good “labor replacement”
because they are more susceptible to abuse than their Latin American H-2A
counterparts. Thai workers are much more isolated than Latina and Latino
workers who may have many linguistic and cultural brethren in the
communities where they work.66 In Yakima, a rural community with
approximately half a dozen Thai speaking residents,67 the workers had no
means by which to complain about their housing conditions and their
suspicions about underpayment of wages. The Washington Thai workers did
not speak English.68 This is likely typical of Thai H-2A workers, as a
majority of the Thai citizens who seek employment abroad are from the
rural, poor69 northeastern part of the country,70 and most of these workers
have no more than a fourth-grade education.71 It was only by chance that
65

President’s Commission on Migratory Labor, Migratory Labor in American Agriculture 3 (1951).
Latina/o and Spanish-speaking migrant workers in central Washington find an established
Spanish-speaking community and have numerous social and legal services resources available to them.
See Yakima Census, supra note 1 (thirty-seven percent of Yakima’s population is Hispanic); Washington
Law Help, http://www.washingtonlawhelp.org/WA/index.cfm/language/39/state/WA (last visited Sept. 19,
2006) (showing the wide variety of legal information available in Spanish to Washington residents);
Consejo, Counseling and Referral Services for the Latino Community, http://www.consejowa.org/aboutus1.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2006) (listing social services in areas from drug abuse to
domestic violence for Washington Latinos). In contrast, Thai speakers struggle to make community
connections. See McDonald Questions, supra, note 3.
67
McDonald Questions, supra note 3.
68
Turnbull, supra note 35, at A18.
69
Kitisak Sinthuvanich and Chitti Chuenyong, Rural Poverty Alleviation in Thailand 2 (United
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Meeting Paper No. 13, 1997) available
at http://www.unescap.org/rural/doc/beijing_march97/thailand.PDF.
70
In 2004, of a total of 121,200 male Thai workers abroad, 80,861 of them were from the
northeastern part of Thailand. Thailand Overseas Employment Administration, Statistics of Thai Workers
by Domicile: Year: 2004 (2004) available at http://www.overseas.doe.go.th/news/index.html. Statistics
from 1998-2003 show similar percentages of workers coming from the northeast. See Thailand Overseas
Employment Administration, Statistics of Thai Workers by Domicile: Year: 1998-2002 (2002), available at
http://www.overseas.doe.go.th/news/index.html.
71
In 2004, of a total of 121,200 Thai men working abroad, 71,329 had completed the fourth grade or
a less advanced education. See Thailand Overseas Employment Administration, Statistics of Thai Workers
66
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they stumbled across the Siam House restaurant and McDonald, its Thaispeaking owner.72 Before meeting McDonald, the workers were utterly
unable to communicate with anyone in the community and were “dependent
in every practical sense” on the farm labor contractor who brought them to
the country.73 Thai workers are hampered by isolation from American rural
communities to a far greater extent than most other H-2A workers.
Thai workers’ reduced ability to complain seems to have incentivized
growers to bring them to the United States. Despite higher costs associated
with recruiting and transporting Southeast Asian workers, farm labor
contractors have brought increasing numbers of Asian workers using the H2A program in recent years.74 This trend represents a shift away from the
historic use of H-2A visas almost exclusively for Latin American and
Caribbean workers.75 In the summer of 2004, a Los Angeles-based labor
recruiter brought approximately 170 Thai workers to labor in the apple
orchards that surround Yakima, Washington.76 The same company intended
to bring 550 workers in subsequent years.77
D.

Thai H-2A Workers Are More Vulnerable to Abuse than Other H-2A
Workers

Thai workers incur much larger recruitment-fee debt burdens than
their Latin American counterparts, rendering the Thais less able to protect
themselves from abuse. The Washington Thai workers paid as much as
$8000 to $20,000 in fees to recruiters in Thailand in order to secure their

by Education Levels: Year: 2004 (2004), http://www.overseas.doe.go.th/news/index.html (last visited Mar.
25, 2006).
72
Ward, supra note 7.
73
Ward, supra note 7; McDonald Letter, supra note 6, at 2.
74
See H-2A, H-2B, Braceros, Rural Migration News, July 20, 2005, http://migration.ucdavis.edu/
rmn/more.php?id=779_0_4_0 (last visited November 4, 2006) (documenting groups of Thai H-2A workers
in California, Arizona, and Hawaii); Florida, Migrants, Rural Migration News, July 15, 2003,
http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=734_0_3_0 (last visited November 4, 2006) (referring to
efforts to supply Thai H-2A workers to Florida farms); Amended Complaint for Damages and Declaratory
Relief, Ingthalangsy v. New Tree Personnel Services, Inc. (E.D.N.C. October 2003) at 5 [hereinafter New
Tree Complaint] (on file with The Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal) (referring to a small group of Lao H2A workers in North Carolina); Carrie Kahn, Western Farmers Look for More Immigrant Workers,
MORNING EDITION, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, May 12, 2006, available at http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=5400389 (referencing major farm labor contractor’s goal of bringing
5,000 Thai workers to twenty-seven states in 2007).
75
See Holley, supra note 23, at 619 (as of 2001, ninety percent of H-2A workers were from
Mexico); Jackson, supra note 16, at 1281.
76
H-2A, H-2B, SSN, Rural Migration News, April 14, 2005, http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/
more.php?id=985_0_4_0 (last visited November 4, 2006) [hereinafter Rural Migration News SSN].
77
Global Horizons Stipulations, supra note 38, at 5.
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places as H-2A workers78—staggering amounts considering that the average
yearly salary in Thailand is just over $2000.79
Numerous accounts demonstrate that it is standard practice in
Thailand for recruiters to charge workers large fees for work abroad.80 Most
Thais who work abroad cannot pay the recruitment fees by themselves and
are forced to take out loans with their homes or land as collateral.81
Usurious interest rates of as much as sixty percent per year are not out of the
ordinary for these loans,82 which often come from “money lenders” rather
than from banks.83 Some of the workers who do not own property for loan
collateral “rent” land deeds from neighbors or relatives, putting them further
in debt.84 Fear of not being able to repay recruitment fee loans seems to be a
constant pressure on Thai workers.85 In fact, there are at least two widely
reported instances of Thai workers who committed suicide because they
were unable to repay their recruitment fee loans.86 An experienced farm
worker advocate has noted that most Latin American H-2A workers who
cannot tolerate abusive conditions “‘vote with their feet’ and leave silently
78

Rural Migration News SSN, supra note 76; McDonald Letter, supra note 6, at 1; Ward, supra note

7.
79
Thailand, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, http://www.fdimagazine.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/
1030/Thailand.html (Jan. 5, 2005) (gross national income per capita in 2005 was $2,190); Ward, supra note
7.
80
$2000 is the equivalent of THB 75,180 (75,180 Thai Baht). Currency Calculator, http://www.xrates.com/calculator.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2006). See Labour Minister Faces Grilling, THE NATION
(THAILAND), Apr. 21, 2002 (citing fees of THB 200,000 for unspecified U.S. jobs); In Brief: Job Scam:
Deported Thais Return from France, THE NATION (THAILAND), May 25, 2003 (citing fees of THB 180,000
to THB 250,000 for promised agricultural jobs in France); Penchan Charoensutthipan, This Needn’t Have
Happened, BANGKOK POST, Aug. 31, 2002 (citing fees of THB 200,000 for jobs in Taiwan).
81
Ward, supra note 7; Supang Chantavanich and Andreas Germershausen, Introduction: Research
on Thai Migrant Workers in East and Southeast Asia, in THAI MIGRANT WORKERS IN EAST AND
SOUTHEAST ASIA: 1996-1997 7 (Supang Chantavanich, Andreas Germershausen, & Allan Beesey eds.,
2000) [hereinafter Thai Migrant Workers, Introduction]. A 1995 Thai Labour Ministry Survey showed that
73.5% of workers leaving Thailand needed loans to do so. Somchai Ratanakomut, Issues of International
Migration in Thailand, in THAI MIGRANT WORKERS IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: 1996-1997 131
(Supang Chantavanich, Andreas Germershausen, & Allan Beesey eds., 2000).
82
Thai Migrant Workers, Introduction, supra note 81, at 7; Paul Handley, Innocents Abroad, FAR
EASTERN ECON. REV., Apr. 1991 at 41; See Phannee Chunjitkaruna, Pitfalls and Problems in the Search
for a Better Life: Thai Migrant Workers in Japan, in THAI MIGRANT WORKERS IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST
ASIA: 1996-1997 263 (Supang Chantavanich, Andreas Germershausen, & Allan Beesey eds., 2000)
(interest of up to 20% per month from village moneylender for job in Japan).
83
Chunjitkaruna, supra note 82, at 263; Handley, supra note 82, at 41.
84
Ward, supra note 7.
85
See Ward, supra note 7 (stating that workers sometimes sit idle, “…not getting paid, which is their
worst fear as interest adds up on their loans back home.”).
86
See Athittaya Wichitanurak, Overseas-job Fees Spur Man’s Suicide, THE NATION (THAILAND),
May 3, 2002 (telling the story of a Thai worker in Taiwan who killed himself over a THB 150,000 loan);
Chunjitkaruna, supra note 82, at 265 (recounting the story of a Thai man who killed himself due to the
prospect of being unable to repay a THB 200,000 loan with punitive interest for a job in Japan).
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rather than complain.”87 Thai workers, on the other hand, are bound to their
jobs by the pressures of recruitment-fee debt.
It is difficult for workers to secure overseas employment from
Thailand without utilizing recruiters. There are four methods that Thai
workers may use to get jobs overseas: 1) registration with the Ministry of
Labour, 2) contact through private labor recruitment agencies, 3) direct
recruitment by employers, and 4) self-arrangement of employment.88 The
two most commonly used methods are private agencies and selfarrangement.89 Although the government service costs less than private
recruiters, workers are reluctant to use it because it is considerably slower.90
A study of Thai workers seeking work in Singapore showed that over 300
times as many workers used private agencies as used the Ministry of Labour
program.91 Indeed, in Thailand, private recruiting agencies account for sixty
to eighty percent of all migrant workers hired.92 Thai workers seeking jobs
in the United States are especially likely to need to work with private
recruiters rather than arrange their own employment for two primary
reasons. First, the United States is culturally and linguistically dissimilar
and extremely distant from Thailand.93 Second, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, for the workers to navigate the H-2A visa process without

87

Hall, supra note 27, at 534.
Diana Wong, The Men Who Built Singapore: Thai Workers in the Construction Industry, in THAI
MIGRANT WORKERS IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA: 1996-1997 71 (Supang Chantavanich, Andreas
Germershausen, & Allan Beesey eds., 2000).
89
Kusol Soonthorndhada, Changes in the Labor Market and International Migration Since the
Economic Crisis in Thailand, 10 ASIAN AND PACIFIC MIGRATION JOURNAL 401, 419 (2001); See Wong,
supra note 88, at 71, table 20 (showing the private recruiters and self-arranging to be the primary methods
of securing foreign work used by Thais bound for Singapore).
90
See Ratanakomut, supra note 81, at 131. The inefficiency of the government recruiting office may
be in part due to the government’s lack of networks in rural areas. Soonthorndhada, supra note 89, at 419.
91
See Wong, supra note 88, at 71. The study shows that in 1992, roughly the same number of
workers made their own arrangements and used recruitment agencies for jobs in Singapore. Id. Selfarrangement would be considerably harder for Thai workers to do with U.S. companies. See infra, Part
III.C.3.
92
Press Release, Int’l Labour Org., As Migrant Ranks Swell, Temporary Guest Workers
Increasingly Replacing Immigrants: Private Employment Agencies Send Millions Overseas to Work, Apr.
18, 1997, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr/1997/9.htm.
93
See Soonthorndhada, supra note 89, at 420, table 12 (showing that Thai workers used selfarrangement far less than private recruiting agencies when going to Israel for work. Israel, like the United
States, is far away from Thailand and culturally and linguistically dissimilar. This is in stark contrast with
the more frequent use of self-arrangement for jobs in Singapore and Taiwan.).
88
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assistance,94 and self-arrangement is more conducive to undocumented
migration than to formalized visa-based processes.95
H-2A workers from Thailand are uniquely vulnerable to the abuses
that pervade the H-2A program. They have limited opportunities to raise
concerns because they are linguistically and culturally isolated. More
importantly, the weighty recruitment debt burden that they bring to the
United States disincentivizes them from complaining about their conditions.
These vulnerabilities make the Thai workers both attractive to employers
and susceptible to abuse.
III.

SUIT UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT MINIMUM WAGE
PROVISIONS IS A VIABLE LITIGATION STRATEGY FOR PROTECTING THAI
WORKERS FROM RECRUITMENT-FEE DEBT

In order to ensure adequate working conditions for Thai H-2A
workers, farm worker advocates must employ a strategy for protecting the
workers from the recruitment-fee debt burden that essentially deprives them
of their ability to protect themselves from abuse. U.S.-based strategies are
necessary because the Thai government has been unwilling or unable to
protect workers from exorbitant recruitment fees. The minimum wage
provisions of the FLSA may provide this needed relief for the Thai workers.
In Arriaga v. Florida Pacific Farms, L.L.C.,96 the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a grower was not liable for recruitment fees under the
FLSA because he was not responsible for the fees under the common law of
agency.97 Despite the holding in Arriaga, recruitment fees may still be
attributable to growers under common law agency doctrines. Two doctrines
that likely apply in the case of Thai workers are apparent authority agency
and inherent agency.98 If the fees are attributable to a grower, the FLSA
requires the grower to reimburse the fees because the fees constitute
improper de facto wage deductions under § 203(m) of the Act and cause the
workers’ earnings to fall below minimum wage.99

94
See
generally
U.S.
Embassy,
Mexico,
Visa
Services:
Temporary
Worker,
http://mexico.usembassy.gov/mexico/evisas_work.html [hereinafter Visa Services] (last visited Sept. 19,
2006) (noting that employers must send documentation to workers before they can even apply for
individual visas).
95
See Soonthorndhada, supra note 89, at 419-21.
96
305 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2002).
97
Id. at 1245-46. Agency law is the body of rules by which the courts determine when one party is
liable for the acts of another. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 64 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “agent”).
98
See infra, Parts III.C.2 and III.C.3.
99
See infra, Part III.D.
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U.S.-based Solutions Are Necessary to Protect Thai Farm Workers
from Recruitment Debt

U.S. solutions to the problem of recruitment fees are needed because
the Thai government does not and will not protect workers from extreme
fees. A prominent U.S. farm labor contractor has claimed that the Thai
government will not allow abusive recruitment and employment practices.100
However, although the Thai Ministry of Labour has imposed limits on
recruitment fees,101 it rarely enforces these limits.102 The recruitment
agencies are often run by politicians who use their influence to sidestep the
regulations.103 Furthermore, widespread corruption within the agencies
responsible for overseas employment deprives workers of essential domestic
protections from exorbitant recruitment fees.104
B.

The Minimum Wage Guarantees of the FLSA Could Provide Relief
from Recruitment Debt for Thai Workers

Under the FLSA, recruitment fees may constitute impermissible wage
deductions that violate the Act’s minimum wage guarantees. The FLSA,
which unequivocally applies to H-2A workers,105 requires that employers
pay workers at least the federal minimum wage of $5.15 an hour.106
Minimum wage is calculated on a weekly basis and must be “free and clear”
of improper deductions.107
The FLSA contemplates two types of deductions: literal and de facto
deductions. Literal deductions are wages which are actually subtracted from
weekly pay.108 De facto deductions are costs of employment that the
employer cannot actually deduct, but that the employer forces the worker to
100

See Turnbull, supra note 35, at A18 (statement of farm labor contractor Mordechai Orain) (“We’d
hear from the Thai government if there was a problem.”); Ward, supra note 7 (statement of farm labor
contractor Mordechai Orian) (“We are not malicious. If we took advantage of these poor people from
Thailand, the Thai government would stop us right away.”).
101
Charoensutthipan, supra note 80.
102
Pravit Rojanaphruk, Confessions of a “Modern-Day Slave Trader,” THE NATION (THAILAND),
Sept. 24, 2000; See Charoensutthipan, supra note 80.
103
Rojanaphruk, supra note 102; See Handley, supra note 82, at 41.
104
Yuwadee Tunyasiri and Pradit Ruangdit, Graft Complaint Against Irawat Labour Secretary Says
It’s a Political Plot, BANGKOK POST, Apr. 24, 2002, available at http://www.thailabour.org/news/
02042401.html; See Wut Nontharit, Employment Scams Must End, Orders PM, Irawat Probed over Permit
Distribution, BANGKOK POST, Apr. 22, 2002, available at http://www.thailabour.org/news/02042201.html.
105
See 29 U.S.C.S. § § 203(e)(1), 206(a) (2000); 20 C.F.R. § 655.103(b) (2005); Arriaga v. Fla. Pac.
Farms, L.L.C., 305 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2002).
106
29 U.S.C.S. § 206(a)(1) (2000).
107
See 29 C.F.R. § § 531.35, 776.4 (2005); See Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1235.
108
See Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1236.
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assume.109 De facto deductions have the same potential to violate the FLSA
as literal deductions because “there is no legal difference between deducting
a cost directly from the worker’s wages and shifting a cost, which they could
not deduct, for the employee to bear.”110
One example of a de facto deduction would be a special uniform that
an employer required a worker to purchase prior to the first day on the job.
If the employer did not reimburse the employee for the cost of the uniform
during the first week of work, the employer would be, in effect, deducting
the cost of the uniform from the worker’s wages for that week.111 In the
same way, when a grower fails to reimburse recruitment fees, these fees may
constitute de facto deductions under the Act. A violation of the FLSA would
occur if the fees, when subtracted from the worker’s total earnings for the
first week of work, push the worker’s wages below federal minimum
wage.112 In order to comply with the FLSA, the grower would need to
reimburse at least a sufficient portion of the fees to ensure that the worker’s
first week’s wage rose to the federal minimum wage.113
An example of the weekly calculation formula for wages under the
FLSA shows how a grower may be required to reimburse a large part of a
particular Thai worker’s recruitment fees. First, imagine that a miner is
required to purchase safety equipment costing $250 before starting work.
During the first week of work, the miner works forty hours at a pay rate of
$10 an hour. The miner’s weekly wages total $400, which is clearly an
average of more than $5.15 an hour (the FLSA-mandated federal minimum
wage). However, the employer must also treat the $250 expense as a de
facto deduction, which pushes the total earnings for the first week to $150.
The average hourly wage is then $3.75 per hour. The employer does not
have to pay the entire cost of the safety equipment, but the employer must
reimburse the miner enough to return the hourly wages at least to the federal
minimum. In this case, the employer would owe the miner $56, which
would raise the total earnings to $206—exactly $5.15 per hour.114
In the case of a Thai worker who paid $5000 in recruitment fees, the
result of the minimum wage calculation would be more extreme. A farm
worker working forty hours at $9 per hour would earn $360 in the first week.
The $5000 recruitment expense, however, would drop this wage to $-4640
109
110
111
112
113

See id. at 1236-1237.
Id.
See Marshall v. Root’s Rest., Inc., 677 F.2d 559, 560-61 (6th Cir. 1982).
Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1237.
Id.; see De Luna-Guerrero v. North Carolina Growers Ass’n, 338 F. Supp. 649, 657 (E.D.N.C.

2005).
114

29 C.F.R. § 531.35 (2005); See Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1237 nn.10-11.
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for the week. The grower would then owe the worker $4846, enough to
raise the wages to $206 ($5.15 for 40 hours). The grower would not be
liable for the entirety of the recruitment fees, but would violate the FLSA
unless she or he paid the worker at least enough to comply with federal
minimum wage requirements.115
C.

Recruitment Fees Charged to Thai Workers May Often Be Attributable
to Growers Under the Common Law of Agency

The only court to address the question of H-2A recruitment fees and
the FLSA began with the premise that in order for the growers to be liable
under the Act for recruitment fees, the fees must be legally attributable to the
growers under agency law.116 That court did not find that the fees there were
attributable to the growers.117 Notwithstanding, under a thorough analysis of
agency law, growers who employ Thai workers may be responsible for the
fees under the doctrines of apparent authority agency or inherent agency.118
1.

Growers May Be Responsible for Recruitment Fees Under the
Doctrine of Apparent Authority Agency

The doctrine of apparent authority agency is outlined in the
Restatement (Second) of Agency (“Restatement”),119 section 27 which
states:
115

See Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1237 nn.10-11.
See id. at 1245. Although the Arriaga court assumed that an agency law analysis was necessary, it
is arguable that agency law determinations are not required at all. The court’s analysis of transportation
fees does not include an agency analysis, but instead proceeds directly to the question of whether
transportation fees are for the primary benefit of the growers. For transportation fees, the court did not
require that the bus companies be agents of the growers in order to charge bus fare to the workers. Id. at
1237. Because no court has addressed whether agency analysis is necessary, this Comment assumes that
agency analysis is required, but it does not analyze, nor does it intend to foreclose, the argument that
agency analysis is not required in order to hold growers responsible for recruitment fees.
117
Id. at 1245-46.
118
See infra, Parts III.C.2, III.C.3.
119
In cases where the FLSA is at issue, courts apply federal common law. United Parcel Service, Inc.
v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, No. 6:00CV6ORL19DAB, 2001 WL 1725291, at *5 (M.D.Fla. Mar. 8,
2001) (citing John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 548 (1964)); See also Steinbach v.
Hubbard, 51 F.3d 843, 845 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying common-law successorship doctrine under the FLSA).
Indeed, when the court applies common law to cases arising under federal statutes, it often uses federal
common law. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957). Federal
courts have traditionally followed the Restatement closely when examining common-law agency questions.
See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752 (1989) (citing the Restatement eight
times and acknowledging a traditional reliance on the Restatement); Moriarty v. Glueckert Funeral Home,
Ltd, 155 F.3d 859, 866 n.15 (7th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that federal courts rely on the Restatement as a
valuable source for establishing the federal common law of agency); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742, 755-56 (1998) (relying heavily on the Restatement in a Title VII case); Morlock v. W. Cent.
Educ. Dist., 46 F. Supp. 2d 892, 902 (D. Minn. 1999) (same).
116
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apparent authority to do an act is created as to a third person by
written or spoken words or any other conduct of the principal
which, reasonably interpreted, causes the third person to believe
that the principal consents to have the act done on his behalf by
the person purporting to act for him.120
Applied to the present problem, a grower might confer on a recruiter the
apparent authority to charge recruitment fees by sending a letter to a worker
saying that the fees were authorized.
However, the grower does not need to have such direct contact with
the workers to confer apparent authority. The common law of agency
dictates that “other conduct” that may establish apparent authority includes
putting agents in positions in which they might ordinarily do the things that
they purport to do. 121 A survey of state agency law as treated by federal
courts shows the firmly established concept of “apparent authority by
position” at common law.122 A principal creates apparent authority when the
principal puts the agent in a position that justifies the third party’s
assumption that the agent has authorization to perform the act in question,
regardless of whether the agent is actually authorized.123
U.S. growers who seek Thai workers generally put recruiters in
positions that justify workers’ belief that they have authority to charge
recruitment fees. It is standard practice for growers to hire U.S.-based farm
labor contractors to recruit H-2A workers for them,124 but these contractors
do not complete that task alone. There are two principal methods by which
U.S. growers can gain access to workers in Thailand: through the Thai
Department of Employment, or through private agencies.125 Due to Thai
regulations, every U.S. grower who uses a Thai private recruiting agency
120

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 27 (1958); see Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1245.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 27 cmt. a (1958). Section 27 comment a states: “[A]pparent
authority can be created by appointing a person to a position . . . which carries with it generally recognized
duties; to those who know of the appointment there is apparent authority to do the things ordinarily
entrusted to one occupying such a position, regardless of unknown limitations which are imposed upon the
particular agent.” Id.
122
Essco Geometric v. Harvard Indus., 46 F.3d 718, 726 (8th Cir. 1995); Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Buster, 241 F.2d 178, 182-83 (10th Cir. 1957) (reh’g denied); Maurice Elec. Supply Co. v. Anderson
Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 632 F. Supp. 1082, 1089 n.13 (D.D.C. 1986).
123
Prop. Advisory Group, Inc. v. Bevona, 718 F. Supp. 209, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). “[A]pparent
authority may arise absent any direct contact between the principal and the third party.” Id. (emphasis
added).
124
See Martin and Taylor, supra note 19, at 1; Shrader, supra note 19. (A single farm labor contractor
in North Carolina brought over half of the United States’ H-2A workers in 1999). The growers in
Washington who recruited Thai workers did so by first hiring Global Horizons, a farm labor contractor.
See Global Settlement, supra note 19, at 1.
125
Thailand Overseas Employment Agency, Thai Manpower Guide, http://www.overseas.doe.go.th/
employers/tmguide.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2006).
121
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will necessarily appoint the recruiter as her “recruiting agent.”126 In order to
use a private agency, the employer must submit, among other things, a
statement of “power of attorney” which authorizes the Thai recruiter to: 1)
recruit and select workers, 2) sign all employment contracts on behalf of the
employer, and 3) apply for visas.127 The relationship between the grower
and the recruiter is thus a formalized one in which the grower has put the
recruiter in the position of “recruiting agent.”
These “recruiting agents” have apparent authority to charge
recruitment fees to workers. Once a labor recruiter is appointed to the
position of “grower’s recruiting agent,” the agent has apparent authority as
long as the agent behaves in ways that are consistent with the habits of the
locality, trade, or profession.128 It is ubiquitous practice in rural northern
Thailand for recruiters to charge recruitment fees to workers who seek
foreign employment.129 The Bangkok recruiting agencies employ local
village representatives (called saay) to make initial contact with workers and
even to help arrange the loans through which the workers pay their
recruitment fees to the Bangkok agencies.130 Thai workers see fees as an
integral part of the recruitment process;131 they have no legitimate reason to
suspect that the recruiters have overstepped their bounds.
If the recruiters charge fees that the growers have forbidden them to
charge—even if they commit fraud in charging the fees—the growers may
still be responsible for their acts under apparent authority agency. The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a principal may be liable for acts of an
agent that are expressly contrary to instructions if the third party has a
reasonable belief that the agent is authorized.132 The Supreme Court,
extending this liability to cases of fraud, explained in American Society of
Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp. (“ASME”) that a principal is
126
See Thailand Overseas Employment Agency, Thai Manpower Guide: Step One: Application for
Approval from the DOE, http://www.overseas.doe.go.th/employers/priv_step.html (last visited Sept. 19,
2006).
127
Id.
128
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 49 cmt. c (1958); See also Essco Geometric v. Harvard
Indus., 46 F.3d 718, 726 (8th Cir. 1995). “Acts are interpreted in the light of ordinary human experience.
If a principal puts an agent into, or knowingly permits him to occupy, a position in which according to the
ordinary habits of persons in the locality, trade or profession, it is usual for such an agent to have a
particular kind of authority, anyone dealing with him is justified in inferring that he has such authority, in
the absence of reason to know otherwise.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 49 cmt. c (1958).
129
See supra Part II.D
130
Wong, supra note 88, at 73.
131
See supra Part II.D.
132
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Buster, 241 F.2d 178, 183 (10th Cir. 1957) (reh’g denied) (holding that
where an agent directly contravened a policy requiring him to report to the home office before entering into
agreements, the principal was still liable for his acts).
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liable for fraud facilitated by an agent’s position when the transaction seems
to the third party to be within the ordinary duties of the agent.133 Thai
workers are justified in thinking that the growers’ agents are charging
authorized recruitment fees, and therefore under the doctrine of apparent
authority, the growers are responsible for the fees.
Strong policy considerations justify holding the employers liable even
for expressly unauthorized or fraudulent acts. The court in ASME pointed
out that liability for principals puts pressure on principals to ensure that their
agents abide by the law.134 Put a different way, growers who are held
accountable for the fees that their agents charge in Thailand are more likely
to take steps to insure that the agents they hire are trustworthy and comply
with instructions.
In the context of Thai workers who are recruited for jobs in the United
States, this policy makes especially good sense. The workers are often on
the other side of the globe from the growers when they first make
arrangements with recruiters and enter into their employment contracts.135
They have few means by which to ascertain the recruiters’ actual scope of
authority.136 The growers may argue that distance and language barriers also
make it difficult to for the growers to effectively control the recruiters’
activities. While this may be true, the growers make conscious decisions
about where to recruit and which recruiters to employ, and they have
financial leverage with the recruiters.137 The growers are in a much better
position to insure that the recruiters comply with their wishes than are the
workers. Thus, the growers should bear the risk of unauthorized acts by
their recruiting agents.
2.

The Court’s Reasoning in Arriaga Leaves Substantial Room for Future
Findings that Recruitment Fees Are Attributable to Growers

Only one circuit court decision, Arriaga v. Florida Pacific Farms,
L.L.C., has directly addressed the issue of recruitment fees for H-2A workers
133
Am. Soc’y of Mech. Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 566 (1982) (reh’g denied)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 261 cmt. a). “[L]iability is based upon the fact that the
agent’s position facilitates the consummation of the fraud, in that from the point of view of the third person,
the transaction seems regular on its face and the agent appears to be acting in the ordinary course of the
business confided to him.” Id.
134
Id. at 572.
135
See McDonald Letter, supra note 6; Turnbull, supra note 35.
136
See Ward, supra note 7; Turnbull, supra note 35.
137
See Brief for Appellants at *10-*12, Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, L.L.C., 305 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir.
2002) (No. 16402-B); Handley, supra, note 82 (showing that recruiters receive commission from
employers).
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and their relation to the FLSA.138 The Arriaga court did not find the
growers in that case to be responsible for recruitment fees because the court
concluded that there were no words or conduct in the factual record which,
interpreted reasonably, could have established apparent authority. 139
However, the Arriaga court did not expressly address the doctrine of
apparent authority by position.140
In Arriaga, the defendant growers hired a farm labor contractor to
recruit workers for their Florida farms, who then contracted with another
international recruiter and travel agent.141 The growers instructed the
recruiters not to charge recruitment fees to the workers, but the international
recruiting agency did so nonetheless.142 The workers alleged that the fees
violated the FLSA by pushing their weekly wages below the federal
minimum wage.143 The Arriaga court did not reach the question of whether
failure to reimburse recruitment fees could violate the FLSA because it
determined that the growers in the case were not responsible for the fees
under the common law of agency.144
There are two reasons that the Eleventh Circuit’s finding in Arriaga
does not foreclose the possibility that courts in the future will find growers
responsible for such fees under the FLSA. First, agency law questions are
inherently fact-specific inquiries,145 thus a determination under agency law
in any particular case is not dispositive of other cases with distinct facts.
Second, the Arriaga court conducted a limited analysis of agency law.146
This analysis, which did not expressly address apparent authority by position
and did not consider other possible routes to agency such as inherent agency,

138

Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1228.
Id. at 1245-46.
140
See id. at 1244-1246. Perhaps the court did not address apparent authority by position because the
parties did not expressly argue it. See generally Brief for Appellants, Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, L.L.C.,
305 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 16402-B); Brief for Appellees, Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, L.L.C., 305
F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 16402-B). However, there was some evidence in the record that the
growers had placed the recruiters in a position that could create apparent authority. For example, the
growers hired the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association (“FFVA”) to be their labor recruiters, and the
FFVA shared these duties with Berthina Cervantes, who ran an international recruiting and travel business.
Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1233.
141
Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1233-1234.
142
Id. at 1234.
143
Id. at 1231-1232.
144
Id. at 1244-1246.
145
See Maurice Elec. Supply Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 632 F. Supp. 1082, 1090
n.13 (D.D.C. 1986); Selheimer & Co. v. Murphy, 319 B.R. 395, 407 (Bankr. E.D.P.A. 2005).
146
See Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1245; see generally Brief for Appellants, Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms,
L.L.C., 305 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 16402-B); Brief for Appellees, Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms,
L.L.C., 305 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2002) (No. 16402-B).
139
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does not set out a comprehensive basis for evaluation of growers’
responsibility for recruitment fees.147
3.

Growers May Be Responsible for Recruitment Fees Under the
Doctrine of Inherent Agency

Under the doctrine of inherent agency,148 growers may be held
responsible for recruitment fees even when the “apparent authority by
position” requirements are not met. Inherent agency holds a principal liable
for the acts of her agent when the third party reasonably believes that the
agent has authority to do what she is doing, regardless of whether the
147

See Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1245; See also infra Part III.C.2.
The most recent draft of the Restatement (Third) of Agency proposes to do away with inherent
agency altogether. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY Introductory Note (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001).
There is an active debate in the literature over whether it is prudent to eliminate inherent agency. See
generally John Dwight Ingram, Inherent Agency Powers: a Mistaken Concept Which Should Be Discarded,
29 OKLA.CITY U. L. REV. 583 (2004); Greggory Scott Crespi, The Proposed Abolition of Inherent Agency
Authority by the Restatement (Third) of Agency: an Incomplete Solution, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 337
(2005); Matthew P. Ward, Note, A Restatement or a Redefinition: Elimination of Inherent Agency in the
Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Third) of Agency, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1585 (2002). In his Note,
Matthew Ward argues against the abandonment of inherent agency because it would change the outcome of
cases in which inherent agency has been correctly applied, and thus would represent a substantive change
from current law. Id. at 1604-1605. Greggory Crespi replies that the Restatement (Third)’s “expansion” of
apparent authority and its re-worded estoppel sections would cover any cases previously covered by
inherent agency. See Crespi, at 359, 362.
The Thai workers’ situation illustrates that inherent agency should be retained as a distinct concept
because it encompasses situations not otherwise covered by the Restatement (Third) of Agency. As a
beginning point, the Third Restatement includes a definition of “manifestation” which serves as an express
recognition of the concept of “apparent authority by position.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §
1.03, § 1.03 reporter’s note a (T.D. No. 2, 2001). This unequivocally covers situations in which a worker
knows that the grower has put the recruiter in the position of “recruiting agent” on the grower’s behalf. On
the other hand, the Third Restatement’s estoppel provision covers situations in which a worker justifiably
believes (for any reason, not limited to manifestations by the grower) that recruitment fees are authorized,
and the grower carelessly causes that belief or both 1) has notice of that belief, and 2) fails to take
reasonable steps to notify the workers of the facts. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 (T.D. No. 2,
2001). Before the court can hold the grower liable under estoppel, the worker must prove that the grower
carelessly or unreasonably caused the worker’s change in position in some way.
The Restatement (Third)’s formulation creates a coverage gap, leaving principals not liable in
situations in which they would have been liable under the Restatement (Second). As Mr. Ward correctly
notes, apparent authority by position does not apply unless the third party knows that the principal has
officially put the agent in a certain position. Ward at 1593-1594. However, “if the agent’s conduct alone
causes the third party’s belief, even if that conduct would make everyone reasonably believe that the agent
has authority, then no apparent authority exists.” Ward at 1591. One can easily imagine a situation in
which a farmer in rural northeastern Thailand might encounter a recruiter, and having nothing to go on but
the manifestations of the recruiter himself, reasonably believe that the recruiter is authorized to charge
recruitment fees. The grower in this situation would be liable for the fees not by apparent authority, but by
the current doctrine of inherent agency. The estoppel inquiries—whether the grower carelessly caused the
belief or knew of the belief and failed to take reasonable steps to notify the worker—would be irrelevant to
an inherent agency analysis under the current restatement. By requiring the worker to prove these estoppel
elements in order to hold the grower accountable, the Restatement (Third) imposes additional burdens on
the claimant, and therefore substantively alters the law of agency.
148
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principal made any manifestations that authority existed.149 In the case of
Thai workers and American growers, the inherent agency doctrine would be
useful specifically when a court has found apparent authority to be lacking
because the workers were unaware that the grower had officially put the
recruiter in the position of “recruiting agent.”
The Restatement section 161 outlines three key requirements for
principals’ liability based on inherent agency: 1) the agent must be a
“general agent”; 2) the acts must “usually accompany” or be “incidental to
transactions which the agent is authorized to conduct”; and 3) the other party
must reasonably believe that the agent is authorized.150 This rule is based on
inherent agency powers, which stem solely from the existence of the agency
relationship itself, and not from actual authority or apparent authority.151
Under the inherent agency power doctrine, “. . . the principal becomes a
party to the unauthorized contract made by his general agent even though
there has been no representation that the agent was authorized.”152
Thai recruiters who demand recruiting fees from workers fulfill the
threefold requirements of Restatement section 161. First, the recruiters are
“general agents” rather than “special agents” of the growers. Under the
restatement definitions, “[a] general agent is an agent authorized to conduct
a series of transactions involving a continuity of service,”153 while “[a]
special agent is an agent authorized to conduct a single transaction or a
series of transactions not involving continuity of service.”154
The
Restatement recognizes that the difference between the two types of agents
is “a matter of degree,” and it gives the following factors as guidance for
making the distinction:
“the number of acts to be performed in
accomplishing an authorized result, the number of people to be dealt with,
and the length of time needed to accomplish the result.”155 Growers hire
farm labor contractors to undertake every aspect of the recruitment and
hiring process. This process, especially for a harvesting crew of 100 or more
workers, includes innumerable contacts and transactions, including initial
discussions of contract terms, contract signing, visa procurement, and travel
149

Ward, supra note 148, at 1586.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 161 (1958).
151
Id. § 161 cmt. a, Id. at § 8A. ( “Inherent Agency Power is a term used in the restatement of this
subject to indicate the power of an agent which is derived not from authority, apparent authority or
estoppel, but solely from the agency relation and exists for the protection of persons harmed by or dealing
with a servant or other agent.”).
152
Id. § 161 cmt b (emphasis added).
153
Id. § 3(1).
154
Id. § 3(2).
155
Id. § 3 cmt. a.
150
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arrangements156 and can take many months. The farm labor contractors and
their sub-agents are thus “general agents” of the growers under the
Restatement definition.
The case of Cardenas v. Benter Farms157 called upon the district court
for the Southern District of Indiana to decide if a farm labor recruiter was a
general agent of his grower.158 The recruiter was employed as a crew chief
by the defendant, and part of his job was to recruit and hire workers.159 The
facts showed that he was hired to “transact all the recruiting business of the
[defendant]” and that the growers did not place any restrictions on the way
in which he was to recruit workers.160 The court applied the Indiana
common law definition of “general agent”161 and held that the recruiter was
a general agent of the growers.162
When Thai recruiters assess recruitment fees to workers, they also
fulfill the second and third requirements of the Restatement section 161:
they are doing something that “usually accompanies” authorized recruiting
acts, and the workers have no reason to believe that they are not authorized
to charge the fees.163 In Thailand, it is standard practice for recruiters to
charge recruitment fees as part of the process of connecting foreign
employers with Thai workers.164 The workers rely on their knowledge of the
system and on the statements of the recruiting agents themselves to make
reasonable judgments that recruiting fees are an ordinary, authorized part of
the recruitment scheme.
The policy rationale behind the doctrine of inherent agency applies
especially well to U.S. growers who recruit in Thailand. The inherent
agency doctrine may seem unduly harsh to employers, but the Restatement’s
drafters argue forcefully that growers, and not workers, should bear the risks
of the recruitment agency relationship. A comment to Section 161 explains

156
See McDonald Letter, supra note 6, at 1; Ward, supra note 7; Visa Services, supra note 94; 20
C.F.R. § 655.102 (b)(5) (2005) .
157
No. IP 98-1067-C T/G, 2000 WL 1372848 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 19, 2000).
158
Id.
159
Id. at *9.
160
Id.
161
Id. at *8. Indiana common law defines a general agent as “one who is authorized to transact all
the business of his principal, or all of his business or some particular kind, or as some particular place.” Id.
162
Id. at *9. The Cardenas court, though not using the term “inherent agency power,” upheld the
doctrine’s rationale: “if one of two innocent parties must suffer due to a betrayal of trust—either the
principal or the third party—the loss should fall on the party who is most at fault. Because the principal
puts the agent in the position of trust, the principal should bear the loss.” Id. at *9 (citing Koval v. Simon
Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299, 1304 (Ind. 1998)).
163
See supra Part II.D
164
See supra Part II.D.
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that agents are essential parts of principals’ businesses.165 Principals reap
efficiency gains when third parties do not have to rigorously scrutinize the
extent of the agents’ authority in every seemingly routine transaction.166 Put
simply, an employer who has benefited from the availability of general
agents should bear the risk that the agent may do unauthorized things. This
risk should not fall on innocent third parties. Thai workers, especially those
who come from the rural northeastern corner of the country, have scarce
means by which to ascertain whether or not the recruiters with whom they
deal are acting according to the growers’ instructions. Even if the workers
knew how to reach the growers by telephone, contact would be exceedingly
difficult because the workers do not speak English,167 and the fifteen hour
time difference168 would complicate communications. The growers, on the
other hand, prefer Thai workers, and they benefit greatly from sending
recruiters to find the workers—a task which growers do not have the time or
the language skills to perform.169 It is the growers, not the Thai workers,
who should bear the risks of the growers’ recruitment efforts.
D.

The FLSA Requires Growers to Reimburse Recruitment Fees

Once a court finds a grower to be responsible under agency law for
recruitment fees, the FLSA requires the court to analyze whether the growers
must reimburse the workers for the fees. The fees are impermissible de
facto wage deductions under the FLSA and must be reimbursed unless they
satisfy two requirements: 1) they must fall within the exception for “other
facilities” as defined in section 203(m) of the Act; and 2) they must be “for
the primary benefit” of the worker, rather than the grower. The recruitment
fees paid by Thai workers do not meet either of the requirements, and are
therefore impermissible deductions. As a result, the growers must reimburse
the workers for enough of the fees during their first week of work to ensure
165

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 161 cmt. a (1958).
Id. “In the situation in which an agent’s powers exist only because of the rule stated in [section
161], the principal’s liability cannot be based upon the rules of contracts, torts, or of restitution, since, by
hypothesis the principal has not communicated with the third person by any authorized means . . . . His
liability exists solely because of his relation to the agent. . . . Commercial convenience requires that the
principal should not escape liability where there have been deviations from the usually granted authority by
persons who are such essential parts of his business enterprise. In the long run it is of advantage to
business, and hence to employers as a class, that third persons should not be required to scrutinize too
carefully the mandates of permanent and semi-permanent agents who do no more than what is usually done
by agents in similar positions.” Id.
167
See supra Part II.C.
168
See Time and Date.com, The World Clock—Time Zones, http://www.timeanddate.com/
worldclock/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2006).
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See infra, Part III.D.3.
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that the workers’ wages meet minimum wage standards. This result
effectuates the purpose of the FLSA by protecting workers who have little
bargaining power.
1.

Recruitment Fees Are Permissible Wage Deductions Only If They Fall
Within the FLSA’s “Other Facilities” Exception

The FLSA and its accompanying regulations provide a two-part test to
determine if wage deductions are allowable. The Act, in 29 USC §
203(m),170 allows certain kinds of wage deductions by providing that
employers can count as “wages”—and therefore legitimately deduct—the
reasonable cost “of furnishing [an] employee with board, lodging, or other
facilities, if such board, lodging, or other facilities are customarily furnished
by such employer to his [or her] employees.”171 In effect, these “customarily
furnished” items count as “wage credits” for employers, and they are
allowable even if they cause weekly take-home wages to fall below
minimum wage.172 The growers in Arriaga argued that recruitment fees
were “other facilities” within the meaning of the Act, and therefore were
allowable deductions.173 However, the FLSA’s accompanying regulations
further clarify that the “the cost of furnishing ‘facilities’ which are primarily
for the benefit or convenience of the employer will not be recognized as
reasonable and may not therefore be included in computing wages.”174 Thus
de facto deductions for recruitment fees that push weekly wages below
minimum wage violate the FLSA unless: 1) they are “other facilities” within
the meaning of the Act, and 2) they are for the “primary benefit and
convenience” of the workers rather than the grower.
Courts tend to blend the analysis for these two inquiries, but they are
conceptually distinct. The first poses a threshold question: whether the
recruitment fees even qualify as “other facilities,” making them eligible to
count toward workers’ wages. If the fees are not “other facilities,” the court
need not look any further—the employer is required to reimburse the fees.
If the fees are “other facilities,” the second element requires the court to ask
if the fees are for the primary benefit of the employer, not the worker. If the
fees primarily benefit the employer, they are not “reasonable” and therefore

170
171

29 U.S.C. § 203(m) (Supp. 2006).
Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, LLC , 305 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir 2002); see also 29 U.S.C §

203(m) .
172
173
174

Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1236; see also 29 U.S.C. § 203(m).
Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1236.
29 C.F.R § 531.32(c) (2005) (emphasis added).
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unallowable de facto deductions from wages. In this scenario, the employer
is also required to reimburse employees for recruitment fees.
2.

Recruitment Fees Do Not Fall Within the “Other Facilities”
Deduction Exception

Recruitment fees should not be considered “other facilities” within the
meaning of the FLSA. The phrase “other facilities” is not defined in the
FLSA, and the Supreme Court has not established a test for determining
whether an item or expense is “other facilities.”175 However, the two circuit
courts that have explicitly dealt with the definitional issue are in agreement;
the phrase “other facilities” must be read in the context of the words “board
and lodging” in section 203(m).176
This view is supported by the text of 29 C.F.R. § 531.32, which
indicates that “other facilities” must be room and board or something
similar.177 Section 531.32 provides examples of things that are similar to
board and lodging, including meals furnished at company restaurants,
housing, general merchandise from company stores, electricity for
dwellings, and transportation to and from work.178 The court in Arriaga
recognized that the common thread among the “facilities” on this list is that
they all “arise in the course of ordinary life.”179 Recruitment fees certainly
do not meet this standard. A worker may pay the fees only once a year,
perhaps even only once in a lifetime.180 The foreign employment
connections that the fees “purchase” are not quotidian necessities, but
extraordinary and infrequent expenditures. The fees, therefore, do not fall
within the section 203(m) of the FLSA and cannot be deducted from
worker’s wages.

175

See De Luna-Guerrero v. North Carolina Growers Association, Inc., 338 F.Supp. 649, 659
(E.D.N.C. 2005).
176
The courts in both Shultz v. Hinojosa, 432 F.2d 259, 267 (5th Cir. 1970) and Soler v. G. & U.,
Inc., 833 F.2d 1104, 1109 (2d Cir. 1987) stated that the phrase “other facilities” is in pari materia with the
words “board and lodging.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “in pari materia” as: “[Latin ‘in the same
matter’] 1. adj. On the same subject; relating to the same matter.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 794 (7th ed.
1999).
177
29 C.F.R. § 531.32 (2005).
178
Id.
179
Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, LLC , 305 F.3d 1228, 1242 (11th Cir 2002).
180
See McDonald Letter, supra, note 6 (recruiters charge fees up front in Thailand before workers
leave the country).
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Recruitment Fees Are Impermissible Deductions Because They Are
“for the Primary Benefit” of the Growers Rather Than the Workers

Even when the courts do find that expenses fall within the category of
“other facilities,”181 these items are not always deductible from pay. Instead,
they receive only a rebuttable presumption of “reasonableness.”182 Workers
may rebut this presumption by showing that the fees were “primarily for the
benefit of the growers.”183 The fact that the regulation contains the word
“primarily” (rather than “exclusively” or “entirely”) is essential to this
analysis because it demonstrates recognition that facilities often benefit an
employee at the same time as they benefit the employer.184 The court then
must determine which party is the primary beneficiary of the fees.
Recruitment fees paid by Thai H-2A workers are “primarily for the
benefit of the growers” under any common-sense reading of the phrase.
Growers are not allowed to hire H-2A workers until they receive
certification from the Department of Labor that there are not any local
workers available to do the work that they require.185 Without the H-2A
workers, the growers’ crops will rot in the fields. Their entire harvests, and
perhaps the very survival of their businesses, may be at stake. By using the
H-2A program, the growers get reliable, documented employees.
The workers also benefit from the farm labor jobs that they obtain by
paying the recruitment fees, but courts have consistently held that expenses
are not for the benefit of the worker merely because they enable the worker
to secure a job in the first place.186 H-2A workers may earn more in the
United States than they do at home. They may also sometimes enjoy better
working conditions at their U.S. jobs. However, as one court observed,
“. . . the issue is not whether working in the United States is better than
working [in their own country] or whether ‘on balance’ working in the
181
By its everyday meaning, the term “facility” connotes “something created to serve a particular
function,” such as a bathroom or a stadium. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY COLLEGE EDITION
484 (2d. ed. 1991). However, the term “facility” in the context of the FLSA is interpreted broadly to
encompass all kinds of services and resources, such as clothing, food, and transportation. See 29 C.F.R. §
531.32 (a) (2005).
182
Soler, 833 F.2d at 1109-10 (holding that the presumption of “deductibility” even for housing—a
clear cut example of “board and lodging”—could be overcome with evidence that the housing was for the
employer’s primary benefit).
183
As outlined in 29 C.F.R. § 531.32 (c), “the cost of furnishing ‘facilities’ which are primarily for
the benefit or convenience of the employer will not be recognized as reasonable and may not therefore be
included in computing wages.”
184
See Soler, 833 F.2d at 1111 (Oakes, J, dissenting).
185
20 C.F.R. § 655.90(b)(1)(A) (2005).
186
See Marshall v. Root’s Restaurant, Inc., 677 F.2d 559, 560-561 (6th Cir. 1982); Shultz v.
Hinojosa, 432 F.2d 259, 266-267 (5th Cir. 1970).
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United States is a ‘good deal’ for the workers.”187 The issue is whether the
growers are the primary beneficiaries of the fees. Though the workers
benefit in some way from the recruitment process (and the fees that facilitate
it), the workers’ availability preserves the growers’ businesses. Thus, the
growers are the primary beneficiaries of the fees.
Beyond the common meaning of “primary benefit,” the Code of
Federal Regulations indicates that things which are “for the primary benefit
of the employer” are things which directly enable employees to do their
jobs.188 29 C.F.R § 531.32(c) provides courts with examples of things that
are for the primary benefit of the employer.189 These include: safety
equipment, electric power when used for commercial production, company
guard protection, charges for rental of uniforms when uniforms are required
by the nature of the business, and transportation that is an incident of and
necessary to the employment.190 All of the listed items enable workers to
complete their assigned work.
Courts have held that long-distance transportation costs are for the
primary benefit of employers because they are necessary for H-2A workers
to do their jobs.191 The Arriaga court held that transportation costs for
workers from Mexico to the United States were for the primary benefit of
the growers.192 The court pointed out that growers who choose to participate
in the H-2A program know that workers will not come from commutable
distances, and that someone will have to pay for their transportations
costs.193 In that instance, the court had the benefit of a specific reference in
the regulations to transportation costs. In the Code of Federal Regulations,
one example of a cost that is for the primary benefit of the employer is
“transportation charges where such transportation is an incident of and
necessary to the employment.”194 The court examined the words “incident”
and “necessary” in detail, and determined that the transportation costs were
“an incident of and necessary to” the workers’ employment because they
were an “inevitable and inescapable consequence of having foreign H-2A
workers employed in the United States.”195
187
De Jesus De Luna-Guerrero v. North Carolina Growers Association, Inc., 338 F.Supp. 649, 662
(E.D. N.C. 2005).
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See 29 C.F.R. § 531.32(c) (2005).
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Though recruitment fees are not specifically mentioned in the
regulations which accompany the FLSA, the same analysis shows that they
are also “an incident of and necessary to” the jobs of Thai H-2A workers.
Growers who choose to employ workers from Thailand will be required by
Thai authorities to authorize Thai recruiting agents to act on their behalf.
This relationship is not only required by Thai law,196 but is also necessary as
a practical matter for U.S. growers, who would otherwise find it impossible
to make contact with the kind of workers they seek—farmers from rural
northeastern Thailand. It is necessary to for H-2A workers to travel long
distances, thus incurring transportation costs, to arrive and work in the
United States. In the same way, it is necessary for employers to use
recruiting agencies to find Thai workers—and someone must pay the
recruiters for their efforts.197 The realities of the Thai recruitment system
make recruitment fees every bit as “inevitable and inescapable” as longdistance transportation costs. As a result, under 29 C.F.R 531.32(c), the fees
“may not be used in computing wages,” including as de facto preemployment deductions.198
4.

Growers Must Reimburse Workers for the Recruitment Fees During
Their First Week of Work

Under the FLSA, a determination that recruitment fees are
impermissible de facto deductions from workers’ pay has a clear
consequence: the employers must reimburse the workers for the major part
of the recruitment fees during their first week of work so that the fees do not
push the workers’ wages below the federal minimum wage.199 The FLSA
mandates that employers pay workers at least $5.15 per hour,200 calculated
on a weekly basis. Workers’ pay must be “free and clear”201 of improper
deductions, both actual and de facto.202 De facto deductions are costs that
the employer does not actually deduct from wages, but instead forces the
worker to incur directly.203 Employers must reimburse employees for
expenses that they incur during the same week that the expenses arise.204 In
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See supra, Part III.C.2.
See supra, Part II.D.
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the case of pre-employment expenses—such as recruitment fees—the
employer must reimburse the costs during the workers’ first week of work.205
E.

Holding Recruitment Fees to Be Impermissible Deductions Under the
FLSA Would Be Consistent with the Purposes of the Act

A finding that recruitment fees are primarily for the benefit of the
growers and the resulting requirement that growers reimburse Thai workers’
recruitment fees would be consistent with the purposes of the FLSA. When
a court is faced with ambiguity in the provisions of the FLSA, the court uses
the legislative purpose of the act to guide its determination of the correct
outcome.206 In Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil,207 the Supreme Court
recognized that the primary purpose of the FLSA was to “aid the
unprotected, unorganized and lowest paid of the nation’s working
population; that is, those employees who lacked sufficient bargaining power
to secure for themselves a minimum subsistence wage.”208 To that end,
workers cannot waive their statutory right to a minimum wage.209
Thai workers often find themselves in dismal economic situations, and
they have very little bargaining power as compared with the U.S. growers
who employ them. If courts allow growers to shift their recruitment costs to
workers without reimbursing them at least to minimum wage levels, the
effect is to allow the workers to waive their FLSA rights in order to secure
employment. If, on the other hand, courts hold growers responsible for the
fees, then the purpose of the FLSA—the protection of those workers least
able to protect themselves—is accomplished.
IV.

CONCLUSION

H-2A workers historically have been vulnerable to abuses by their
employers. Thai H-2A workers are particularly disadvantaged because they
arrive in the United States already saddled with staggering debt from the
recruitment fees they pay to secure their jobs. Despite the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision in Arriaga, the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA can provide
substantial protection to these workers. In most cases involving Thai
workers, recruitment fees will be impermissible de facto wage deductions
205

Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1237 (citing Marshall v. Root’s Restaurant, Inc., 677 F.2d 559, 560 (6th Cir.
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under the Act. Suit under the FLSA minimum wage provisions can hold
agricultural employers liable for their recruitment costs. As a result, the
Thai H-2A workers, provided with essential relief from recruitment-fee debt,
will have increased freedom to protect themselves from abusive conditions
and employment practices.

